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ABSTRACT 
The Air Base has long been a potential target of attack for enemy 
planners.  An effective way to attack the United States Air Force (USAF) is to 
avoid its usual dominance in the air and use an asymmetrical approach, 
attacking airbases with ground forces inserted into the Joint Rear Area. 
The history of airbase ground attacks from 1942 to 1994, documented in 
the book Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, shows that the dominant strategy employed 
by air base attackers has been the standoff attack.   Roughly, 75 percent of all 
airbase attacks have been through the use of rockets or mortar fire from outside 
the airbase’s perimeter defenses.  In Vietnam, where the defenses against 
penetrating ground attacks were emphasized, this percentage rose to 96 percent.  
Historically robust main operating bases, with passive defensive measures 
such as hardened facilities and redundant systems, have been able to withstand 
standoff attacks.  The relative inaccuracy of the attacker’s standoff systems and 
their limited ability to sustain fire on the air base minimized damage. 
Times have changed and the USAF finds itself operating in an 
expeditionary mode across the globe.  Expeditionary Air Forces cannot depend 
on the luxury of operating off airfields with the robust infrastructure of main 
operating bases.  In addition, the emergence of man portable, guided munitions 
for mortars and guided anti-tank missiles has increased the accuracy of potential 
standoff weapons.  Finally, the sophistication of Improvised Explosive Devices in 
Iraq and of modern radio-controlled model aircraft even suggests the potential for 
attackers to build their own guided standoff weapons.  The potential for a “one 
shot, one kill” standoff weapon is here today, negating the effectiveness of 
passive hardening measures. 
Disrupting these attacks will take new strategies.  Understanding current 
Joint and USAF doctrine is the first step.  Areas for further study include 
disrupting the enemy forces before they launch a standoff attack, intercepting the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. CHANGES AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR  
 With the emergence of the Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) concept in the 
mid 1990’s, a major change in the structure and mindset of the United States Air 
Force (USAF) occurred.  An Air Force that was structured to reinforce North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in the defense of Western Europe (as 
well as Japan, South Korea, etc) and to carryout the nuclear Single Integrated 
Operations Plan (SIOP) was transformed to meet emerging requirements.  The 
need to project combat power to different locations across the globe was the new 
requirement for the USAF in the post-Cold War environment.  
 Under this new EAF concept a major change in the basing of 
expeditionary aircraft occurred.  In the Cold War, expeditionary aircraft could 
count on arriving at massive main operating bases with hardened and redundant 
support systems.  With hardened aircraft shelters, redundant fuel systems, 
redundant runways and taxiways, and hardened personnel structures, main 
operating bases contained everything an Air Force needed to generate aircraft 
while under fire.   Today, EAF personnel must set up operations on any available 
airfield in the region where they deploy.  The advantages of hardened and 
redundant support systems are, for the most part, gone.  
 The USAF generates all of its air-breathing combat power from air bases.  
The skilled men and women who perform the tasks that make an air base work 
have transformed the generation of fixed-wing combat aircraft, specially modified 
sensor platforms that support air and ground operations, and cargo and tanker 
aircraft sorties into an art form.  The complex interactions of hundreds of 
personnel are needed to launch each aircraft.  Maintenance personnel must 
ensure the aircraft are ready to launch, fuels personnel must fuel them, 
ordinance personnel must prepare the munitions and on and on.  Any breakdown 
in this chain of interactions can leave aircraft on the ground and necessary 
missions unflown.  The environment where all of these tasks occur is the air 
base. 
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 The shift from the main operating bases to airfields that lack hardened and 
redundant systems have left today’s Expeditionary Air Forces more vulnerable to 
attack on the ground then ever before.  “Operations may require the Air Force to 
deploy on short notice to air bases where combat support functions are not fully 
in place, to include urban, remote and, in rare cases, bare base environments 
(AFI 31-101, 2002, pg 4).”  Because this vulnerability exists, a future opponent of 
the USAF would be wise to attempt to exploit it.   
 The USAF is a dominant force in the skies.  The skill level of USAF 
personnel is extremely high and the amount of money the nation has invested is 
unmatched.  In 2005, the budget of the United States Air Force was $120.5 
billion (GlobalSecurity.org, 2006); easily more than the combined total defense 
budgets of China, North Korea and Iran combined (CIA World Fact Book, 2006).  
Attempting to overcome the USAF in the sky to exploit the vulnerabilities of on 
the ground is an expensive option for an enemy that does not guarantee 
success. 
 Ground attack has been an effective method of attacking airbases when 
attack from the air is not possible.  The attacks launched by British Special Air 
Services personnel against the Luftwaffe in North Africa during World War II 
provide an example of ground attacks by special operations forces (Vick, 1995).  
Viet Cong attacks on U.S. air bases during the Vietnam War show that insurgent 
forces can also carry out these attacks.  Over the years the standoff attack, 
where attackers fire at the base with long-range weapons from beyond the 
perimeter defenses of the base, has emerged as the most frequently used 
method of attack. 
B. THE STANDOFF THREAT TO AIRBASES 
A Rand Corporation study titled “Check-Six begins on the Ground” (Vick, 
1995) found that 75 percent of all ground attacks against air bases from 1940 to 
1994 utilized standoff weapons.  The types of weapons used to complete these 
attacks were mainly medium mortars and unguided rockets.   
During the Vietnam War, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units 
executed 493 separate air base attacks with the primary intention of disrupting 
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operations and raising the cost of the war for the U.S.  The result was 375 aircraft 
destroyed and over 1,200 damaged.    Approximately 96 percent of these attacks 
were made using standoff weapons (Vick, 1995). 
During the Vietnam War, the U.S. Air Force created a hardening program 
that included the use of aircraft revetments that greatly reduced the effectiveness 
of these unguided attacks in destroying aircraft.  While continued attacks slowed 
sortie production, aircraft losses to these attacks greatly declined (Vick, 1995). 
 Hardening has limits.  Large, easy to recognize transport planes are 
difficult to protect from the effects of standoff attacks.  Areas where personnel 
gather—dining facilities, tents, and other temporary quarters—are expensive and 
difficult to protect as well.  In addition, hardening is intended to keep the damage 
from an effective attack from spreading to other resources, as a firewall is meant 
to protect other parts of a building.   
The ability of an enemy to use guided weapons to target individual aircraft 
or facilities would seriously undermine the effectiveness of hardening.  A small, 
guided weapon provides an effective means to attack aircraft and facilities, even 
when revetments protect them.  An airbase attack that used this type of weapon 
could directly affect the ability of an airbase to launch and recover its aircraft. 
In his book, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, Vick (1995, p. 110) warns about 
the introduction of guided standoff weapons tipping the balance of power in the 
favor of the attacker.  The potential for the attacker to use laser-guided mortar 
rounds, wire or laser-guided anti-tank rounds or Guided Standoff Improvised 
Explosive Devices (i.e., a small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle with a camera and an 
explosives charge) adds a degree of effectiveness to an attack that poses a very 
serious challenge to the defender.  The range of these weapons gives the 
attacker the ability to operate in an area too large for the defender to effectively 
control using today’s base defense concepts and systems. 
This paper will explore the possible introduction of guided standoff 
weapons into the role of attacking air bases.  Chapter II will look at U.S. airbase 
defense doctrine.  Chapter III will use mathematical modeling to look at three 
game scenarios involving air base defense.  Chapter IV will survey the availability 
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and suitability of current weapons systems to perform a guided standoff attack on 
an airbase.  Chapter V will look at the feasibility of building a guided standoff 
improvised explosives device.  Finally, Chapter VI will look at potential strategies 




II. U.S. AIR BASE DEFENSE DOCTRINE 
A. JOINT DOCTRINE 
In Joint Pub (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, base defense is defined as “local military measures, both 
normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy 
attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure the maximum capacity of its facilities 
and resources are available to U.S. forces (AFI 31-101, 2002, pg 4).”  
 Military organizations run their operations based on established doctrine.  
The key doctrine document that discusses base defense is JP 3-10, Joint 
Doctrine for Rear Area Operations.  U.S. conventional military operations are 
dependent on the projection of combat power from the rear area to support 
ongoing military operations.  It is hard to imagine the success of Operation 
Desert Storm without airpower and logistical support from the bases in the rear 
area.       
JP 3-10 is the collected set of lessons learned from past conflicts, military 
history, combined with expectations on the future form of military conflict.  
Searching through this document, no discussion of standoff attack, except for 
preparations for air and large missile attacks can be found.  What is discussed is 
the increasing vulnerability of the rear area to attack. 
Rear areas are increasingly vulnerable to modern enemy forces 
with sophisticated surveillance devices and systems, accurate, 
long-range weapon systems, and transport assets, which are 
capable of inserting forces deep behind friendly lines. Foreign 
intelligence and security services will continue to pose espionage, 
disinformation, and psychological operations threats. Threats posed 
by indigenous elements capable of the full spectrum of 
unconventional operations ranging from sabotage to large-scale 
raids and ambushes are also likely. (JP 3-10, 1996, p. I-1) 
 Enemy threats to the rear area are classified into three categories, Level I, 
Level II, and Level III.  These categories are intended to provide a common 
magnitude of these threats to military forces. Typical Level I threats include:  
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enemy-controlled agents, enemy sympathizers, terrorism, and civil disturbances 
(JP 3-10, 1996, p. I-5).  Level II threats are guerrilla forces (“irregular and 
predominantly indigenous forces conducting guerrilla warfare”), unconventional 
forces (“special operations forces are highly trained in unconventional warfare 
techniques”) and small tactical units (“specially organized reconnaissance 
elements with the capability of conducting raids and ambushes”) (JP 3-10, 1996, 
p. I-6).  
 Level III threats include large numbers of conventional forces, tactical 
missile and aircraft attacks, and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
attacks (JP 3-10, 1996, p. I-6). 
 Individual bases in the rear area must build their defenses to meet the 
specific demands of the threats and the terrain in which they are located.  Bases 
and base clusters (closely located bases that integrate their defenses) are 
expected to detect and defeat Level I and Level II attacks.  Bases must have the 
capability to delay a Level III attack until the arrival of supporting, friendly forces 
(JP 3-10.1, 1996, p I-5). 
 In this era of coalition warfare, host-nation and allied forces play a major 
role in the defense of the rear area.  If a base is fortunate to be located in a 
country with capable police and military forces, these forces add a great deal of 
depth to the base’s defenses.  The effective control of the areas between bases 
in the rear area by host-nation forces helps to deny attackers a safe haven.  As 
the effectiveness of the host nation’s control of its territory increases, the 
probability that an enemy attack on a base will fail also increases.   
Allied forces may be collocated on a base with U.S. forces and take some 
of the responsibility for the defense of the base.  Allied forces may also make up 
the reaction force to counter a Level III threat to the rear area. 
 Understanding joint doctrine is important to understanding the importance 
of base defense to the United States military.  Understanding the way that the Air 




B. AIR FORCE DOCTRINE 
 As stated earlier in this paper, the Air Force generates its air-breathing 
combat power from the rear area.  Ground combat units are dependent on the 
rear area for logistical support but the actual combat power is generated on the 
front lines.     
Because of the dominance of the US Air Force in the air, future enemies 
may adopt an asymmetric strategy that attempts to use ground attacks to 
neutralize the USAF in the skies.  It follows that winning the majority of the 
battles in the base defense struggle is critical to winning the war in the air.  The 
USAF’s base defense strategy is critical in this effort.    
 As stated, the key document to look at to understand the Air Force’s 
implementation of U.S. base defense doctrine in Air Force Instruction 31-101, Air 
Base Defense.  AFI 31-101 recognizes the history of attacks on air bases and the 
potential for future problems. 
Asymmetric threats will increasingly challenge base defense forces. 
Historically, elements such as special forces, light infantry, 
airborne, airmobile, terrorist, guerrilla, and irregular units have 
successfully employed unconventional warfare tactics to harass 
personnel and equipment (AFI 31-101, 2002, pg 4). 
 From a review of this document, it is clear that the knowledge of the 
potential threat to airbases is available in the Air Force.  AFI 31-101 uses the 
information from Vick’s Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest and the Rand Corporation’s 
Check-Six Begins on the Ground to understand base attacks of the past. 
 One of the critical areas discussed in 31-101 is the threat from standoff 
weapons attacks.  It states:   
The standoff attack is more difficult to detect and defeat and can 
include attacks against resources outside the legal base perimeter 
(e.g., water lines, fuel lines, power grids). Historically, seventy-five 
percent of the attacks against air bases have been conducted with 
standoff weapons making this the most likely threat to Air Force 
personnel and resources.  [T]he range of rockets, mortars, shoulder 
launched anti-aircraft weapons, and large caliber machine guns 
offer the potential adversary a large area beyond the perimeter 
fence from which to attack an air base, to include departing and 
recovering aircraft. (AFI 31-101, 2002, pg 6) 
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From this quote, it is clear that the problem of standoff attacks is understood.    
 Air Force Instruction 31-101 also recognizes the impact of advances in 
technology on the attacker’s ability to affect the operations airbase. “The 
acquisition of technologically advanced equipment such as portable surface-to-
air missiles, guided mortar munitions, and night vision devices make these 
adversaries even more difficult to detect and neutralize.  (AFI 31-101, 2002, pg 
5)” Of particular interest to this thesis is the mention of guided mortar munitions.  
These weapons and others with similar capabilities are the emerging standoff 
threat that poses a prime challenge to airbases in the future.   
It is clear from reading AFI 31-101 that the Air Force recognizes the threat 
that standoff weapons, and especially guided standoff weapons pose.  
Recognizing an emerging threat is the first step in dealing with it but recognition 
does not guarantee that a problem will be dealt with.  Unless this threat is 
mitigated, future Air Force operations might be threatened.  A look at how the 
USAF defends its air bases is required to see if this emerging threat is being 
properly handled. 
C. DEFENDING THE BASE 
 In looking at a base defense plan, the first step is to understand the threat.  
As listed above there are three levels of threat that are categorized by Joint and 
USAF doctrine, Level I, Level II and Level III.   
      A Level I threat can be “characterized as small-scale operations 
conducted by agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, partisans, and agent-supervised 
or independently initiated terrorist activities (AFI 31-101, 2002, pg 5). “  Level I 
threats are small in size, difficult to detect and generally must get close to their 
target to cause damage.  In addition, once they are detected, they are the easiest 
threat for a base security force to defeat. 
 Because of the characteristics of a Level I threat, a strong counter 
intelligence program and basic security measures (controlling access, recognition 
systems, barriers a co-located response element) are usually enough to defeat or 
deter an attack.  AFI 31-101 recommends that the “way to defeat the Level I 
threat is to disrupt the planning process through the use of sound 
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antiterrorism/force protection techniques before an attack occurs (pg 5, 2002).  
Protection against the Level I threat causes the defense force (either dedicated 
defense personnel or personnel from the resource to be defended) to distribute 
defensive forces to many different points across the base.  These forces are tied 
to the resources they are protecting and are difficult to assemble and maneuver 
to provide effective defense against a Level II or III threat. 
The second threat to an air base (Level II) “include(s) long-range 
reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and the sabotage of air or ground 
operations conducted by special-purpose, guerrilla and unconventional warfare 
forces or small tactical units (AFI 31-101, 2002, pg 5).”  Level II threats, which 
encompass the use of standoff attacks, generally demand higher skills and more 
capable weaponry they Level I threats.  They do not have to get close to a 
resource to damage or destroy it. 
 Countering the Level II threat requires a different defensive posture than 
the Level I threat.  A nominal air base defense would consist of observation posts 
on the base perimeter, defensive strong points (containing crew-served machine 
guns and grenade launchers), and a vehicle-mounted mobile reserve.  Barriers 
along high-speed avenues of approach, anti-personnel obstacles, sensors, night 
vision devices, and reinforced base entry control points would add to a base’s 
defenses.  When relations with the host nation allow for it, off-base patrols to 
gather intelligence and deny standoff weapons launch locations add an extra 
layer to this formidable defense.    
 The effectiveness of this defensive scheme in deterring and defeating 
penetrating Level II attacks is impressive.  The air base attack data from Vick 
show that 75 percent of attacks on airbases used stand off weapons.  If we focus 
on just the Vietnam War, this number rises to 96 percent, showing the evolving 
effectiveness of base defenses against direct attacks and the ineffectiveness of 
these defenses against standoff attacks (Vick, 1994, p. 106).   
Even with the majority of attack on airbases coming from standoff attacks, 
base defenders cannot simple abandon their defensives against a ground assault 
and distribute their forces to look for standoff weapons.  The results of a 
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successful Level II ground assault can be disastrous.  In 2001, a ground assault 
by the Tamal Tigers on a combined airbase and airport in Colombo, Sri Lanka 
destroyed four wide-body commercial aircraft and a large portion of Sri Lanka’s 
“small but effective” Air Force (Brown, 2001).  Consequently, defenses against a 
ground attack must remain the first priority of an air base. 
Defending against a Level III threat is the final task for a base defense 
force.   A Level III threat is a “major attacks by large tactical forces that can use 
airborne, heliborne, amphibious, and infiltration operations. Attacks can also 
come from aircraft and theater missiles armed with conventional and Nuclear, 
Biological, or Chemical (NBC) weapons (AFI 31-101, 2002, pg 6).”  Individual 
bases are not expected to defeat a Level III attack; they are supposed to delay 
the assault until support can arrive.  In the case of a ground assault, the 
defenses that are set up to defend against the Level II assault are the basis for 
the defense.      
A threat-based defense is the standard concept for protecting an airbase 
from attack.  The Level I threat drives the defender to distribute personnel to 
control access to specific resources.  These personnel are difficult to assemble 
and maneuver against Level II and III threats.  The Level II and, because they 
use the same defenses, Level III threats drive a system of observation posts, 
strong points and mobile forces controlling the approaches to the perimeter of the 
base.   
The effectiveness of these defenses in defeating penetrating attacks has 
driven base attackers to use standoff weapons to launch their attacks on 
airbases.  These standoff attacks exploit a hole in the active defenses of an 
airbase and force the base to rely on hardening and protective measures to 
mitigate their effects.  In the era of unguided standoff attacks, this system proved 
to be effective enough to keep an airbase operating.  However, what happens if a 
standoff attack can be tailored to defeat these hardening measures?  Chapter III 
will model this possibility using game theory. 
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III. MODELING  
A. MODELING THE PROBLEM 
Modeling provides a powerful tool to make complex interactions 
understandable.  This chapter of this thesis will apply modeling to look at the 
problem of an air base defense force opposing an attacker.  The defending force 
can posture its forces to counterattack a ground attack or a standoff attack.  The 
attacker can choose to launch a ground attack against the base or employ 
standoff attack weapons from beyond the range of the base’s defenses.  Three 
different games will be explored:  The attacker using unguided standoff weapons, 
the attacker using guided standoff weapons, and the defender introducing a 
methodology to greatly reduce the effectiveness of any type of standoff attack, 
guided or unguided.  
The advantage of a standoff attack for the attacker is the large operating 
area the attack can come from (and hence the defender has to control with 
observation and fire) and the ability of the attacker to avoid the majority of the 
base’s defense.  The range of his standoff weapon defines the area where an 
attacker can operate and the distance to the target (a tent city, an aircraft parking 
area, etc) he wishes to attack.  This area can be simply defined by the formula 
for a circle, Area = π (r) 2.  If the attacker has an 82mm mortar with a range of 8 
km, the defender must defend an area of approximately 201 km2 from each 
target.  For simplicity, we will assume one target for the attacker, an aircraft 
parking area, located at the center of the airbase.  (With the large number of 
potential targets for standoff attacks on an airbase, many of them located on the 
edge of the base’s perimeter, it is easy to see how this area can increase greatly.  
The size of a modern airbase, many containing 10 km runways, only increases 
this problem).   
American base defense doctrine says that the defender must be able to 
keep an attacker from interfering with or destroying the base’s critical assets 
(Joint Publication 3-10.1, 1996, p. IV-8).  The foundation of any good base 
defense plan ensures that these resources are protected.  The reason for this is 
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tied to the vulnerability of aircraft and air-launched weapons on the ground.  I 
offer the following analogy:  Hit an aircraft with a sledgehammer, you can do 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in damage with each blow and, in a short time, 
make it unflyable and possibly put it beyond repair.  Hit an M-1 tank with a 
sledgehammer and you hurt your hands.   
Starting the defense at the resource that is being secured makes the 
attacker’s task more difficult.  Increasing the distance between the resource and 
where the attacker can launch his attack, increases the complexity of the 
methods that the attacker must use.  If the attacker can touch the aircraft, the 
methods of attack can be very simple (the proverbial sledgehammer, arson, etc).  
As distance increases, the attacker must use methods that are more complex.  
For example, hitting a target with a rifle from 300m takes more skill than a point 
blank attack.  A 1200m shot with a sniper rifle takes more skill than the 300m 
shot.  Hitting the target with a mortar round from 7 km is still more complex.   
In addition to the factor of complexity of the attack, close in attacks are 
thought to be more precise then standoff attacks.  “Penetrations allow attackers 
to defeat camouflage, deception and hardened systems designed to protect 
against air and stand-off attacks. Close-in attacks can generally inflict more 
precise damage than that caused by stand-off weapons (AFI 31-101, 2002, pg 
6).” 
Hence, a Level I attacker can be best characterized by a sapper or an 
attack enemy agent operating on the airbase.  If a small number of these 
individuals can gain unrestricted access to an aircraft or other target, they can do 
massive damage with relatively simple means.  A Level II attacker, which has a 
force of up to battalion size (600-man), can use sapper attacks, direct ground 
attacks, or standoff attacks to affect the airbase.  A Level III attacker strikes with 
a force of greater than 600-men.  A Soviet-style breakthrough force provides a 
potential example.  As noted earlier, doctrine expects a base to be able to defeat 
Level I and II attacks and to delay Level III attacks until reinforced.   
 In his book, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, Vick (1994, p. 110) warns about 
the introduction of guided standoff weapons tipping the balance of power in the 
13 
favor of the attacker.  The potential for the attacker to use laser-guided mortar 
rounds, wire or laser-guided anti tank rounds or Guided Standoff Improvised 
Explosive Devices (i.e., a small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle with a camera and an 
explosives charge) adds a degree of effectiveness to an attack that cannot be 
matched by the defender. 
B. THE GAMES 
 In this chapter, we will look at three zero-sum games where the attacker 
(assuming a Level II force operating in the area around the base) can choose a 
ground attack or a standoff attack, and the base defenders can choose to defend 
against a standoff attack or a ground attack.  Based on the Vietnam base attack 




Figure 1.   Scoring the Game 
 
 
 Let us breakdown these values and look at their graphical representation 
in Figure 1: 
 
 - At a value of zero the Level II force is destroyed 
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 - At a value of 100 the base is destroyed/held by the Level II force.   
 
- Between 0 and 10, the Level II force is only able to do minimal damage 
to the airbase and cause limited disruption to operations.  The defender 
wins the game in this range.   
  
- Between 0 and 50, the Level II force is able to cause damage to the base 
and disrupt operations.  As the score gets closer to 50, more pressure is 
placed on the defense force to stop attacks. 
  
- Once the score reaches 50 and above major damage is inflicted to the 
base and the defense force is reinforced.  The game is lost by the 
Defense Force/won by the Level II force.  This is considered a loss by the 
defense force because reinforcements must be pulled from other 
operations, potentially affecting the broader war effort. 
 
1. Game One:  Conventional Standoff Weapons 
 In the first game, we will look at a scenario where the enemy is armed with 
conventional standoff weapons.  These weapons can be mortars, unguided 
rockets or any other weapon with an effective range of over 1500 meters (the 
maximum range of the Mk-19 grenade launcher, the most powerful weapon 
organically available to USAF ground defenders, (AF I 31-301 (2002), p. 30).  In 
this game, the defense force is trying to minimize the value of the game while the 
attacker is trying to maximize it.  The defense force can choose to concentrate 
their forces to defend against a ground attack (keeping them close to the base) 
or to defend against a standoff weapons attack by spreading them out on 
ambush patrols to attempt to stop these attacks.  The Level II force can choose 
to launch a ground attack or a standoff attack against the base. 
 Neither player has a dominant strategy.  Both players will adopt a mixed 
strategy to attempt to improve their positions (see Figure 2).  Let us look at this 




Figure 2.   Game One Courses of Action  
(See Appendix 1, Game 1 for calculations) 
 
a. Game One Results 
In game one, the attacker has the choice of using a ground attack 
or a conventional standoff attack and the defender has the choice of 
concentrating his forces to counter the ground attack or spreading them out in 
the potential launch area in an attempt to stop a standoff attack.  Neither player 
has a dominant strategy and to obtain the optimal score, both players will pursue 
a mixed strategy.  In this mixed strategy, the defender should defend against a 
ground attack in 69.1 percent of the games and defend against standoff attacks 
30.9 percent of the time while the attacker should use 84 percent standoff attacks 
and 16 percent ground attacks (See Appendix 1, Game 1 for calculations).   
The value of this game is 25.372.  The attacker is causing damage 
to the base and disrupting operations but not to the level where he is able to win 
the game (50 or above).  The defender is receiving more damage then he wants 
and while not losing the game, base operations are disrupted, limiting the 
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2. Game Two:  Guided Standoff Weapons 
 In the second game, we will look at a situation where the enemy is armed 
with guided standoff weapons.  These weapons offer the attacker a much greater 
chance of destroying the target because of their guidance systems and improved 
accuracy and again have an effective range of over 1500 meters.  In this game, 
both players have identical goals and strategies as game one.   The defense 
force is trying to minimize the value of the game while the attacker is trying to 
maximize it.  The defense force can choose to concentrate their forces to defend 
against a ground attack (keeping them close to the base) or to defend against a 
standoff weapons attack by spreading them out on ambush patrols to attempt to 
stop these attacks.  The Level II force can choose to launch a ground attack or a 
standoff attack against the base. 
 Neither player has a dominant strategy but the value of ground attack vs. 
standoff defense; standoff attack vs. ground defense and standoff attack vs. 
standoff defense all greatly increase (See Figure 3).  All of these increases can 
be attributed to the increased effectiveness of the guided standoff weapon.  (The 
increase in standoff attack effectiveness is obvious.  The increase in the ground 
attack vs. a standoff attack is due to the ability to use the guided standoff weapon 
to eliminate a key component of the base’s remaining defenses, supporting the 
attacker’s ground assault.)  Both players will adopt a mixed strategy to attempt to 
improve their positions.  Let us look at this game.       
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Figure 3.   Game Two Courses of Action 
(See Appendix 1, Game 2 for calculations) 
 
a. Game Two Results 
In game two, the attacker has the choice of using a ground attack 
or a guided standoff attack and the defender has the choice of concentrating his 
forces to counter the ground attack or spreading them out in the potential launch 
area in an attempt to stop a standoff attack.  Neither player has a dominant 
strategy and to obtain the optimal score, both players will pursue a mixed 
strategy.  In this mixed strategy, the defense force should defend against a 
ground attack in 49.5 percent of the games and defend against standoff attacks 
50.5 percent of the time while the attacker should use 89.9 percent standoff 
attacks and 10.1 percent ground attacks (calculations in appendix one).   
The value of this game is 45.051.  The attacker is causing almost 
twice as much relative damage to the airbase and is much closer to the level 
where he is able to win the game (50 or above).  The defender is much closer to 
losing this game and the ability of the base to support the larger military effort is 
greatly reduced when compared to game one.  The introduction of a more 
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3. Game Three:  Counter Standoff System 
 In the final game, we will look at a scenario where the defender has 
introduced an improved capability of disrupting standoff attacks.  The method(s) 
used to disrupt standoff attacks is not important to this game. This system can 
interrupt standoff attacks before they are launched, intercept the rounds in flight, 
or prevent their detonation when they reach the target (or it can use a 
combination of these methods to obtain the reduction in the total score seen on 
the game matrix).  The Level II force is armed with the same guided standoff 
weapons from game two.   
Again, in this game, the defense force is trying to minimize the value of the 
game while the attacker is trying to maximize it.  The defense force can choose 
to concentrate their forces to defend against a ground attack (keeping them close 
to the base) or to defend against a standoff weapons attack by spreading them 
out on ambush patrols to attempt to stop these attacks.  The Level II force can 
choose to launch a ground attack or a standoff attack against the base. 
 Neither player has a dominant strategy but the value of standoff attack vs. 
ground defense and standoff attack vs. standoff defense both decrease (see 
Figure 4).  All of this decrease can be attributed to the counter standoff system.  
Both players will adopt a mixed strategy to attempt to improve their positions.  Let 




Figure 4.   Game Three Courses of Action  
(See Appendix 1, Game 3 for calculations) 
 
a. Game Three Results 
 In game three, the attacker has the choice of using a ground attack 
or a guided standoff attack and the defender has the choice of concentrating his 
forces to counter the ground attack or spreading them out in the potential launch 
area in an attempt to stop a standoff attack.  The difference in this game from 
game two was the introduction of a highly effective method of disrupting standoff 
attacks against the base.  Neither player had a dominant strategy and to obtain 
the optimal score, both players pursued a mixed strategy.  In this mixed strategy, 
the defense force should defend against a ground attack in 90 percent of the 
games and defend against standoff attacks 10 percent of the time while the 
attacker should use 94.7 percent standoff attacks and .053 percent ground 
attacks (calculations in appendix one, game three).   
The value of this game is 9.52.  The Level II force is not destroyed 
but the defender wins the game in this range.  Attacks of the airbase will continue 
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freely support the larger military effort.  The introduction of a more effective 
standoff weapon has been trumped by the defender’s newly found ability to 
disrupt standoff attacks. 
4. Conclusion 
 These three games attempted to show different scenarios in the 
continuing struggle between the attacker and the base defender.  The chance for 
the attacker to improve their results by introducing guided weapons technology to 
their attacks should cause worry to airpower advocates.  This modeling shows 
that counter standoff systems can be highly effective but unlike the guided 
standoff weapons available to potential attackers today, these systems do not yet 
exist. 
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IV. ADAPTING EXISTING WEAPONS SYSTEMS 
A. EXISTING WEAPONS ADAPTABLE FOR GUIDED, STANDOFF 
ATTACKS 
 The costs of directly attacking the resources on an air base can be made 
quite high by the defender.  As we have seen by the historical data laid out by 
Vick (2005) and the modeling of the problem in Chapter II, the attackers of a 
base have and will increasingly turn to standoff methods to attack air bases.   
This chapter will look at the weapons systems, which are readily 
adaptable for use by countries, or non-state actors who want to attack air bases.  
The desired characteristics of these weapons systems will be examined and the 
types of weapons systems that are available will be discussed. 
1. Desired Characteristics of Available Weapons Systems 
To perform future standoff attacks with existing weapons systems, 
attackers are looking for a system that is long-range, accurate, simple to use, 
light and compact, and that allows the attacker to avoid counterattacks and allow 
them to escape (which will be call survivability).  The first factor we will look at is 
range. 
a. Long-Range 
In developing standoff methods to attack air bases, an attacker 
needs a weapons system that outranges the longest range weapon that the 
defender has while also allowing him to hit the target.  The most effective 
weapon, organic to the United States Air Force, available to engage a standoff 
attack is the Mark-19 grenade launcher.  This weapons system has the ability to 
fire 40 mm grenades at any attacker without any complex interactions with a fire 
direction center.    
If the defenders have a Mark-19 grenade launcher with a maximum 
range of 1500 meters on the perimeter of the base and the target is an additional 




would allow the attacker to fire with impunity (with a 500 meter safety zone).  
Using this as a baseline, an attacker should look at weapons systems that have a 
range of 3000 meters or greater.   
If the attack is overt and the launch location is easily detectable by 
the defenders, it is easy to imagine the defender maneuvering to close the 
distance to engage the attackers.  However, it takes time to mount a reaction 
force and the launch location of standoff weapons systems is not always clear.  
b. Accuracy 
Standoff weapons have always used their long-range to attack 
targets on airbases.  The missing link, from the point of view of the attacker has 
always been accuracy.  The ability of the attacker to hit the target they are aiming 
at has always been this method’s Achilles heel.  To overcome this problem, an 
attacker needs to find existing weapons systems that have guidance systems 
already installed.  The method of guidance can be by global positioning satellite, 
wire, laser, or gyroscope.  Each of these methods of guidance has their own 
advantages and disadvantages, but from the point of view of the attacker, any 
reliable guidance package on their standoff ordnance greatly increases their 
probability of a successful attack.  Using this thought process, any weapons 
system that has a guided capability can meet this criteria.  
c. Simple to Use 
The attacker is operating in potentially hostile terrain.  Therefore, 
any weapons system that is too complex to rapidly and effectively employ is a 
liability.  However, most of the military systems that are available off-the-shelf 
can be quickly learned and mastered.  As the user interfaces for these systems 
become more advanced, the complexity of operating these systems should come 
down. 
d. Light and Compact 
From the attacker’s point of view, it would be advantageous to use 
large artillery pieces to obliterate the targets on an airbase but the scope of this 
study does not permit this.  This study assumes that the attacker is operating in 
an area where they must remain relatively covert, similar to the posture of the  
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Viet Cong forces attacking U.S. bases in South Vietnam.  Because of these 
restrictions, the attacker is looking for a weapons system that is light and 
compact.  
Using the criteria of the Russian Army a system is manportable if it 
(or the components that make it up) weighs from 11 to 44 pounds (five to 20 
kilograms), portable if it weighs from 46.2 to 88 pounds (21 to 40 kilograms) and 
should be vehicle mounted if it weighs over 88 pounds (40 kilograms) 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/at-4.htm, 2006).  Using these 
criteria and assuming a six-person attack group, a maximum weight of 264 
pounds (120 kilograms) is set for man portable systems that will use no vehicle 
support.  
An attacker that can use vehicles to support their attacks has a 
great advantage in payload and maneuverability.  Small trucks have been used 
very effectively to launch asymmetric attacks on US forces.   
During the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, US troops encountered 
an unanticipated, and formidable, weapon in the Iraqi arsenal — 
Russian-built Kornet antitank missiles. Iraqi commandos traveling in 
three-man teams dressed in black civilian robes and riding in 
Nissan pickup trucks moved against the flanks of columns of armor 
from the US Army's 3rd Infantry Division and launched broadside 
attacks from several kilometers away using the system 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/at-14.htm, 
2006). 
The real key for the attacker is the ability to hide the weapons 
system before and possibly after an attack.  A Nissan Titan pickup truck has a 
payload of 1378 lbs and a bed size of approximately 70 cubic feet (assuming a 
24 inch height for ease of hiding) (Nissan USA, 2006)  Subtracting weight for 
other gear and the three personnel, This leaves a payload of 500 pounds and 
room for a hidden 50 cubic foot system. 
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e. Survivability 
The final criterion that an attacker is looking for in a future standoff 
attack system is the ability of the system to enable the attacker to avoid 
counterattacks and escape.  Several different system characteristics can aid the 
attacker. 
A small launch signature can be very helpful to the attacker.  A 
weapon that has a low noise and visual signature would be extremely helpful.  A 
defender who does not know where an attack came from does not know where to 
send the counterforce. 
A version of a fire and forget system would also assist the attacker 
in their attempt to escape the scene.  A very simple version of a fire and forget 
system can be a timer that allows the attacker to set up the system and leave the 
scene minutes or even hours before the system fires.  A remote activation of a 
weapons system would have the same effect as the timer.  A more complex 
weapons system might have the ability to lock on to a target without any further 
guidance from the operator, allowing the attacker to concentrate all of his efforts 
on leaving the scene. 
Finally, a system with a rapid launch sequence or a fast flight time 
can help the attacker to escape.  The shorter the flight time of a weapon that 
required terminal guidance, the sooner the operator can make their escape.   
2. Existing Weapons Systems  
There are five desired characteristics for existing weapons systems (long-
range, accurate, simple to use, light and compact, and survivability) have been 
identified and discussed.  The next step in this process is to look at available 
weapons systems that meet these specific criteria. 
Using the weapons data found in Jane’s Infantry Weapons (Jane’s, 2006); 
two promising weapons systems for air base attack emerge.  These weapons 




a. Guided Mortar Rounds 
The first type of weapons system that meets the requirements of a 
potential airbase attacker is a guided mortar round.  Usually using a laser 
designator to home in on a target, these rounds can deliver their explosive 
payload to within a few meters of a selected target.   
Currently, guided rounds are only available for mortars of 120 
millimeters, making it the only available choice.   The Russian military currently 
fields (and has available for export) the laser-guided “Gran” 120-millimeter mortar 
projectile with a weight of 25 kilograms and a range of 7,500 meters (Jane’s, 
2006).   The U.S. Army’s Precision Guided Mortar Munition, offers a range of up 
to 15 kilometers, accuracy to within a meter of a target and a projectile weight of 
17.2 kilograms (Jane’s, 2006).  This round will enter service in 2008.   
Laser designators and guidance packages in guided mortar rounds 
work in tandem to increase the accuracy these rounds over conventional rounds.  
The laser designator reflects a beam off the selected target and the sensor in the 
nose of the round controls impulse thrusters that steer it towards the target.  The 
high trajectory of mortar rounds give the guidance controls more time to function, 
giving these rounds more accuracy than flat trajectory munitions.    
Using a mortar in conjunction with a laser designator is not the 
simple task that an attacker would like it to be.  Coordination between the 
designator and the mortar crews takes practice. Additionally, it takes basic 
knowledge of the mortar system and ballistics to get the mortar round close 
enough to the designated target for the guidance package to function.     
The 120-millimeter mortar is not a light weapon.  The U.S. Army’s 
M120, 120-millimeter mortar weighs in at 145 kilograms with the tube weight of 
50 kilograms, a base plate weight of 62 kilograms and a tripod and sight total 
weight of 33 kilograms (Jane’s, 2006).  Added to that weight is the 17.2 to 25 
kilogram weight of the U.S. or Russian projectiles respectively.   
The 120-millimeter mortar system does not exceed the 50 cubic 
foot (cubic meter) space limitations.  Using the attacker’s established 
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requirements above, the 120-millimeter mortar would be limited to use where 
vehicle support was available.  The use of a simple handcart could greatly 
improve the mobility of these systems and aide in their resupply. 
The ability of the mortar crew to operate in one location and the 
laser designation team to operate in another area gives the mortar an advantage 
in the category of survivability.  The mortar crew can fire their rounds and be in 
the process of leaving the area while the laser designator team, potentially 
operating several kilometers away, guides the rounds on to the target.  
Additionally, the high trajectory of a mortar round gives it the ability to fire from 
behind a hill or building, avoiding detection and direct fire from the airbase, 
further enhancing survivability. 
(1) Assessment of the Guided Mortar Round. The high 
trajectory of the mortar helps make it an ideal weapon for attacking an airbase.  
The ability to fire the weapon indirectly (although the laser designator must have 
line of sight to the target), from behind the cover of a building or a hill, is a great 
advantage.  The high trajectory also allows the round to avoid hitting obstacles 
(buildings, terrain, etc) on its flight path to the target. 
The improved accuracy of a guided mortar round also 
improves on the mortar’s strengths.  Vick (1995, p. 107) showed that the majority 
of standoff attacks on airbases used under ten rounds.  These rounds usually fell 
in a circular pattern around the aim point, occasionally hitting the target, but most 
of the time exploding harmlessly.  A guided mortar round can put a single round 
within one meter of the target, destroying it the first time. 
The weight and complexity of the entire mortar system do 
not make it an ideal system for all airbase attackers.  Because of the training and 
skill required to operate the mortar and the separate laser designator system, 
only Level II attackers who have the necessary training could benefit from this 
system.  Special Operations teams or insurgents with their support would be the 
most likely attacker to acquire and effectively use this type of system.  
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The high weight of this system also cuts down on its 
effectiveness.  Even with the advantage of indirect fire, the threat of attack 
aircraft from the base requires mobility.  The attacker must keep possession of 
the 145-kilogram mortar if they wish to launch further attacks with it.  The use of 
the mortar in urban areas (where vehicles blend in) or in heavy vegetation (where 
weapons and people can hide) can mitigate these problems for the attacker.  
Moving a 120-millimeter mortar is going to take the support 
of a motor vehicle or a cadre of dedicated people using wheeled carts and 
muscle power.  In an urban area, motor vehicle support might blend into the 
background but the use of checkpoints and roadblocks might expose a Special 
Operations team.  Any special operations team operating a 120-millimeter mortar 
is going to want the support of a large number of local people, increasing their 
detectable signature, and opening an avenue for counterintelligence efforts to 
exploit. 
Overall, the guided mortar munition could be a very effect 
system for standoff attacks on an airbase.  In terms of cost benefit ratio, this 
weapons system could have a very high payoff, trading $30,000 dollar munitions 
for $180 million dollar aircraft.   
(2) Available Guided Mortar Rounds. The weapons of ten 
leading arms manufacturing nations (Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
Israel, Russia, Serbia, United Kingdom, and United States) were reviewed in 
Jane’s Infantry Weapons.  Of these ten nations, only Russia has a guided mortar 
round currently available, the Gran.  This 25-kilogram projectile round has a 
range of 7,500 meters (Jane’s, 2006). 
The United States and Israel both have guided 120-
millimeter mortar rounds nearing production.  The 17.2 kilogram Precision 
Guided Mortar Munition, expected to begin fielding in 2008, offers a range of up 
to 15 kilometers and accuracy to within a meter of a target (Jane’s, 2006).  The 
Israeli Fireball system offers the same range and one-meter accuracy (Defense-
Update, 2004) and is also expected to be fielded in an 81-mm mortar.  (The 
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availability of a guided 81-millimeter mortar to an attacker takes away many of 
the weight and logistical disadvantages of the 120-millimeter system and makes 
this mortar more versatile.)  Both the U.S. and Israeli systems use the Global 
Positioning System to guide the mortar round into a positional “basket” where the 
laser guidance can take over (Defense-Update, 2004).   
The limited number of guided mortar systems currently 
available helps to limit the choice of different threat systems.  However, another 
type of weapons system, using multiple guidance strategies, is widely 
available…the anti-tank missile. 
b. Anti-Tank Missiles 
The anti-tank missile was originally designed to give the 
infantryman a portable, standoff system to destroy armor.  Because of its 
heritage, this system offers many of the features needed for a Level II force to 
conduct a guided, standoff air base attack. 
The requirement for 3000 meters in range limits this search to the 
medium anti-tank missiles, characterized by the U.S. TOW (Tube-launched 
Optically tracked Wire-guided) missile or the Russian AT-3 Sagger missiles.  
Both of these missiles in their original configurations have the required 3000-
meter range (Jane’s, 2006).  Many newer, lighter systems have ranges that 
exceed 3000 meters.  
Anti-tank missiles use a wire guidance system, a laser guidance 
system, or a fire and forget system.  An operator using a control wire that 
streams from the back of the missile to the operator control station directs wire-
guided rounds to a target.  For laser-guided rounds, the operator projects a beam 
of light on the intended target and the laser guided round homes in on the 
reflected light.  A fire and forget system uses a round that locks on to a selected 
target (using a laser or an imaging system), holds that target, and guides itself to 
it without any further input from the operator.  All of these systems possess the 
accuracy required. 
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Because these systems are direct fire by nature, they are less 
complex to use then indirect fire systems.  The process of seeing the target, 
aiming at the target and firing is an extension of basic marksmanship and 
inherently easier to teach.  Because of their original intended purpose, these 
systems are designed to be simple to operate and use. 
The medium anti-tank missile is designed to be man portable.  The 
TOW missile itself weighs 20 kilograms while the launcher and tripod weigh less 
than 100 kilograms and are designed to be broken down for carry (Jane’s, 2006).  
This meets the requirement for a man portable system.  Adding vehicle support 
to this type of system would give the attacker more mobility and the ability to 
carry more ammunition. 
Because of the range of these systems is greater than the range of 
the defender’s organic weapons, they are survivable.  However, the need for the 
operator to guide the missile on to the target and to stay on the target until impact 
lowers the survivability of the operators of some of these systems when 
compared to fire and forget models.  The need for an AT-3 Sagger operator to 
keep a target locked for the full 25-second flight time of the missile (Global 
Security.org, 2006) might be a disadvantage if the base defenders have a patrol 
nearby.   
(1) Assessment of Anti-Tank Missiles. Anti-tank missiles 
may present the best, currently available option, for performing guided standoff 
attacks against air bases.  Their original design, to support infantry with an anti-
armor standoff capability, has led to a system that is light enough to move, 
simple to operate and effective out to long ranges.   
The anti-tank guided missile gives an attacker the ability to reach out and strike 
individual targets on an air base at long range. 
Even with all of its advantages, the anti-tank missile does 
have some design drawbacks as a standoff weapon for air base attack.  The first 
of these is its flat-trajectory, which is especially a drawback for wide-guided 
systems.  Such systems require a debris-free flight path to avoid disconnecting 
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their wires.  Obstacles such as building, fences, and hills can break this wire 
causing the missile to fly off out of control.  This flat trajectory also limits the 
missile to firing positions where the target is in direct view.  This can aid the 
defender by limiting the ground he has to control, allowing him to set up counter 
measures.  
Another drawback of the anti-tank missile is the design of its 
warhead.  Many of these missiles have a shape-charged warhead, designed to 
puncture a small-diameter hole in the side of a main battle tank.  These 
specialized warheads are far less effective against softer targets than 
conventional high explosive rounds.  Such warheads, however, can be replaced 
or modified and many systems with dual-purpose warheads have become 
available. 
A final drawback of more sophisticated anti-tank missiles is 
the lack of a dedicated, man portable, launch platform and control station.  As 
many of these systems became more complex, these missiles were designed to 
be launched from either aircraft or dedicated vehicle mounts.  This does not 
mean that these missiles and their control stations cannot be modified; it simplify 
makes their use against an airbase more difficult. 
(2) Availability of Anti-Tank Missiles. Again, the weapons 
of ten leading arms manufacturing nations (Belgium, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, Israel, Russia, Serbia, United Kingdom, and United States) were 
reviewed in Jane’s Infantry Weapons. The purpose of this search was to look for 
Anti-tank Guided weapons that fit the needs of an air base attacker.  The results 
are displayed by country or combined when the countries use the same systems. 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Serbia, and the United Kingdom produced 








System:  Red Arrow   
Guidance: optical wire-guided, microwave-guided or laser beam riding 
(Depending on variant) 
Range :  3000 - 5500 Meters depending on type   
System Weight: 89.2 Kilograms with launcher (Variant 8E)   
Speed:  200 meters/second  





System:  Spike Long-Range (LR) and Extended Range (ER)   
Guidance: Dual mode: fire-and-forget or fire-observe-and-update (using 
a fiber-optic two-way link) 
Range :  4000 (LR) to 8000 (ER) Meters    
System Weight: 26 Kilograms    
Speed:  Not given 
Warhead:  High-explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT)   
 
System:  MAPATS   
Guidance: optical laser beam riding 
Range :  5000 Meters    
System Weight: 89 Kilograms    
Speed:  19.5 seconds to 4000 meters 




System:  AT-2 Swatter (NATO designation)  
Guidance: optical radio-guided  
Range :  4000 Meters    
System Weight: 26.5 Kilograms (missile only)    
Speed:  150 meters/second 
Warhead:  5.4-kilogram HEAT   
 
System:  9P163-1 Kornet   
Guidance: Laser beam-riding missile with Semi-Automatic Command to 
Line Of Sight  
Range :  5000 Meters    
System Weight: 55 Kilograms    
Speed:  240 meters/second (estimated) 
Warhead:  HEAT or Thermobaric Explosive    
 
System:  AT-5 Spandrel   
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Guidance: optical wire-guided  
Range :  4000 Meters    
System Weight: 48.5 Kilograms    
Speed:  206 meters/second (estimated) 
Warhead:  2.7 kilogram HEAT    
United Kingdom 
 
System:  Swingfire   
Guidance: optical wire-guided  
Range :  4000 Meters    
System Weight: not given    
Speed:  not given 
Warhead:  shape charge 
 
United States    
 
System:  Javelin Extended Range   
Guidance: Infrared homing, fire and forget  
Range :  4000 Meters    
System Weight: 22.3 kilograms    
Speed:  not given 
Warhead:  tandem shape charge 
 
System:  TOW   
Guidance: optical wire-guided  
Range :  3750 Meters    
System Weight: 120 Kilograms   
Speed:  200 meters/second 
Warhead:  HEAT 
 
It is clear that there are a number of anti-tank missiles 
available from weapons manufacturers across the globe.  The newer, lighter-
weight systems should be of particular interest to any potential airbase attackers, 
the use of which could give an attacker much greater mobility and survivability 
then older, heavier systems while delivering warheads through a more reliable 
means.   
c. Final Thoughts on Existing Weapons Systems 
It is clear that the anti-tank missile is today’s most capable system 
with the guided mortar round playing a complimentary role by bringing greater 
range to the fight.  Nations who produce and export these highly accurate 
weapons should carefully consider where and whom they export them to.  
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Serious consideration should also be given introducing controls that render these 
systems inoperable if they fall into the wrong hands (for example, components 
that must receive updated codes when scheduled depot level maintenance is 
performed).  The power of these small, accurate weapons in the wrong hands 
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V. AN UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE AS A GUIDED, AERIAL 
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The increasing sophistication of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) 
attacks in Iraq has shown that insurgent groups have the ability to build complex 
and lethal standoff weapons.  The open source data available demonstrates the 
ability of these groups to adapt their IEDs when faced with countermeasures.  
This technical sophistication opens the doors to an even more complex mode of 
attack.   
Instead of waiting for a target vehicle to enter the limited “kill” radius of a 
roadside IED, future enemies could develop a system to deliver an explosives 
payload to a target.  A small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) with a video 
camera to guide the attack can provide such a capability, and it is not outside the 
ability of insurgent groups to build such a device.  This chapter will explore a 
possible design for a UAV that could be used to attack aircraft on an airbase. 
B. A THEORETICAL GUIDED AERIAL IED DESIGN 
 A guided aerial IED will have four main components: an explosive 
payload, a guidance system, an airframe/power combination, and a control 
station.  Let us look at each of these in turn.  
1. Payload 
 The first design factor we will look at is the weight of the explosive payload 
that the UAV must carry.  This weight will affect the size of the airframe, the 
power requirements for the motor(s) and the effective range of the UAV.  The 
weight of the payload is a function of the accuracy of the delivery vehicle (how 
close can the UAV get the explosives to the target) and the nature of the 
expected target.   
 The data from the Vietnam War shows us that a high explosives 82-
millimeter mortar shell would be an effective basic payload.  Weighing only 4.2 
kilograms (9.24 pounds), it has a kill radius (50% of unprotected personnel within 
this radius will die from shrapnel or blast effects) of 17 meters (Sinodefense.com, 
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2006).  This shell has demonstrated the ability to destroy parked aircraft in the 
past (Vick, 1995 and 1996). With its roots in the former Warsaw Pact, the 81-mm 
projectile is also widely available on world arms markets.  Assuming that there 
might be some additional weight added to ensure the proper detonation of the 
shell, the required weight for the explosives payload will be raised to 5-kilogram 
(11 pounds).  If we keep the 5-kilogram weight limit, it is easy to imagine different 
payloads for different purposes.   
For a wide-area attack, hand grenades might be used.  Imagine 
fragmentation grenades, with their pins pulled, placed in a thin glass tube 
(designed to hold their spoons in place and scored to help it shatter on impact).  
A one-kilogram tube could hold up to eight, half-kilogram grenades with a five 
meter kill radius and spread them in an arc from the point of impact of the UAV. 
A similar payload could be used to start fires. A mixture of fragmentation 
grenades (to blast holes in fuel tanks) and incendiary grenades to ignite any 
combustible materials could be devastating.  A one-kilogram glass sleeve could 
theoretically hold two, one-kilogram incendiary grenades and four, half-kilogram 
fragmentation grenades. 
A final payload design that could maximize the destructive effects of the 
explosives payload is an improvised explosives payload.  The 82-millimeter 
mortar shell contains a large amount of metal that is needed to protect the 
projectile from the explosive force and rapid launch acceleration from a mortar 
tube.  This durability is not needed if the explosives are delivered by the relatively 
gentile flight of a small UAV.  Designing a custom explosives device for these 
UAVs would allow for more explosives resulting in a larger kill radius.  Metal 
pieces would still be needed to provide fragmentation but at a much lower weight 
than the original shell.  This route would require more sophistication then simply 
using existing munitions but an enemy that could build a guided UAV should be 





2. Guidance System 
 The simplest guidance system for a guided Aerial IED would be a small 
video camera.  This camera could allow the operator to fly the IED into a target.  
There are several camera systems available to model airplane hobbyists that 
would provide this capability.  Many of these systems are limited to a broadcast 
range of around 300 meters (www.rc-cam.com) by Federal Communications 
Commission regulations but there are systems available to HAM radio operators 
that advertise a range of up to 8 miles (12.8 kilometers) 
(www.transmitvideo.com/don_article.html, 2006).  A group could easily modify 
one of the short-range camera systems by increasing the power of the 
transmitter or simply acquire one of the longer-range systems. 
 A far more sophisticated system would involve the use of gyroscopes and 
Global Positioning System information.    With such a system, an insurgent group 
could develop an autonomous UAV feasibly capable of flying to within a meter of 
a point.  With a little advanced reconnaissance, a group could have a “fire and 
forget” IED that flies itself to a target without the need for additional human input. 
This type of system would be limited to only the most sophisticated of insurgent 
groups but it would not be beyond the capability of a nation-state to provide it to a 
group that it is supporting.        
3. Airframe and Power 
 The world of radio-controlled model airplanes offers everything an 
insurgent group would need to build the airframe of an effective guided aerial 
IED.  From balsa wood to polystyrene, the materials to build an airframe are 
available.  Control surfaces (ailerons, rudders, etc) and the systems to operate 
them are also available.  With an effective design, a practiced hobbyist with a 
limited workshop and access to parts could easily build a working airframe. 
 The question of how to power a small UAV comes down to a choice 
between a gas engine and electric motors.  Gas offers more power per weight 
but requires a generator to power electrical systems.  Gas engines also make 
much more noise than electric motors.  Both the Air Force’s Desert Hawk and the 
Marine Corp’s Dragon Eye small UAVs use electric motors (Dragon Eye, 2003 
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and Desert Hawk, 2003).  Because these systems are very similar in size to the 
guided aerial IEDs we are discussing and a low noise signature is important to 
limit early warning for the defender, an electric motor is preferable. 
 The Desert Hawk uses a very simple system of laptop computer batteries 
to power it.  These batteries give it an operating endurance of 60 to 90 minutes 
(Perrien, 2003).  An insurgent group might not need this much operating 
endurance and could lower the weight by reducing the number of batteries. 
4. Control Station 
 Controlling the guided aerial IED is the final step to delivering it to a target.  
The world of radio controlled model airplanes offers a basic control device 
capable of flying such an airframe.  The standard transmitter for radio-controlled 
airplanes allows the operator to fly it in exactly the same manner.  Again, FCC 
regulations limit the range of these devices to roughly 800 meters 
(www.novagate.com/~jmartin/hobbie.htm, 2006) but they can be easily modified 
by increasing the power output of the transmitter and improving the antennas. 
 One problem with using these control stations is the amount of training 
and concentration they require.  An experienced hobbyist can easily operate one 
of these platforms if they can see the aircraft but to effectively use a guided aerial 
IED, it must be used at a distance where observing a small UAV would be 
difficult.  Learning to fly one of these systems through a camera would also be 
difficult and take a good deal of practice. 
 The answer that both the Marine Corp and the Air Force turned to was a 
software-powered autopilot.  Operated from a laptop computer, the system uses 
downloaded maps and waypoint guidance to take the UAV where the operator 
wants it to go.  Using this type of system, an insurgent could program the 
software to fly the guided aerial IED to within close range of a target and then 
manually guide the UAV into the target aircraft using the camera.  This software-
based autopilot is not a requirement for an effective weapons system, but it does 
reduce the training time and concentration needed to launch an effective attack.  
Now that we have looked at the elements of a theoretical design, we shall 
examine an actual prototype. 
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C. BUILDING AN AERIAL IED 
 A theoretical design for putting an explosive payload into a small, guided 
UAV is one thing actually doing it is another.  From 2004 through today, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has sponsored a “Red Cell” program to test 
possible uses of small UAVs by terrorist groups.  As a part of this program, DIA 
worked with a group of Midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy to come 
up with a workable Guided Aerial IED prototype (Burns, 2006).  
 Using parts from radio-controlled model shops, aluminum, carbon fiber 
and a 31cc Craftsman weed-eater motor (louder than the electric motor 
recommended earlier in this chapter but has the advantage of not needing heavy 
batteries and is widely available), these midshipmen built a working UAV that 
could easily pose a standoff threat to airbases.  Their design has an 8-foot 
wingspan, has an empty weight of 18 pounds, and an estimated payload of 12 
pounds.  By mounting a video system to RC aircraft using simple zip ties, these 
Midshipmen have consistently achieved “5-10 foot targeting accuracy from a 
standoff range” (Burns, 2006). 
 Although these midshipmen are extremely bright, the ability to build this 
aircraft did not require any great level of skill.  A basic knowledge of radio 
controlled aircraft, electronics, small engines, and explosives along with access 
to a very basic shop space would allow a terrorist group to duplicate this feat.  
The growing sophistication of IEDs in Iraq indicates that terrorist groups possess 
or have the ability to acquire this knowledge. 
 The cost of this guided aerial IED is frighteningly low.  Not including the 
cost of an explosive payload, the midshipmen were able to build this aircraft for a 
little under $300.  Imagine a terrorist or insurgent group trading a $300 guided 
aerial IED for a $200 million C-17.    
D. CONCLUSION 
 A guided aerial IED is within the capabilities of a sophisticated insurgent 
group.  Using off-the-shelf technology largely aimed at hobbyists and some 
knowledge of electronics and explosives, an engineer could easily construct a 
highly effective device.  With the power of the internet, successful designs can be 
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shared on the internet, making their proliferation and improvement easier.  The 
threat of the guided aerial IED is coming, how military and security forces 
prepare for it will tell us how effective it will be.    
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VI. COUNTERING THE THREAT 
A. THE THREAT IS HERE 
 The emerging threat of guided standoff weapons attacks against airbases 
is here.  Weapons are available off the shelf and can be constructed that exploit 
a known weakness in active base defense measures.  It is not beyond possibility 
that a small group of individuals could completely disrupt the operations of an air 
base during a conventional conflict.  It is also possible that such a small group 
could deny the use of a base to the United States Air Force by making the cost in 
material and personnel losses too high.   
This, the final chapter, will provide some potential areas for countering the 
guided standoff threat.  The effort required to fully develop these ideas is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  I hope, however, that this chapter will provide some 
areas for future study and development. 
B. THE KILL CHAIN 
Looking at the problem of launching a guided standoff attack from the 
enemies’ point of view may provide some insight.  The success of improvised 
explosive device attacks in Iraq offers a tangible model to build on.  Colonel 
William Hix (2006), a National Security Affairs Fellow from the Hoover Institute at 
Stanford University, offers the following chain of events (Figure 5) for an attacker 
launching an Improvised Explosive device attack in Iraq.    
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Figure 5.   Improvised Explosives Device Kill Chain 
 
 From planning to the launch of the attack, the enemy must complete all of 
the steps in this chain to initiate an attack.  If the defender can interrupt the 
enemy in any of the steps prior to the attack the attack will not occur.  If the 
defender can capture or kill the attackers and prevent their escape, future attacks 
might be prevented.  In attempting to disrupt this process, the defender must find 
the weakest and most vulnerable links in this chain of events and exploit them.    
 It is easy to apply this same kill chain process to the problem of guided 
standoff attacks.  A nominal kill chain for a Level II air base attacker is shown in 
Figure 6.  Unlike the established insurgent group in Figure 5, this group of 
attackers has the additional task of infiltrating the Joint Rear Area and 
establishing an operating infrastructure before they can deploy their guided 














Figure 6.    Nominal Air Base Guided, Standoff Weapon Kill Chain 
 
The added complexity here offers additional possibilities in preventing 
guided standoff attacks.  The USAF strikes at the airpower infrastructure 
(airfields, surface-to-air missile batteries, radars, etc) of an enemy in the process 
of attempting to achieve air superiority.  If it is suspected that an enemy will 
attempt to use specific ground units to attack friendly airbases, these enemy 
ground units should be targeted in their garrisons.   Attacking these units, prior to 
their attempts to infiltrate into the Joint Rear Area, becomes an extension of the 
struggle for air superiority.  Targeting suspected infiltration vectors (submarines, 
boats, planes) may provide another method to prevent these attacks.    
C. A DEFENSE OF MANY LAYERS 
 With the enemies large launch footprint, the task for the base defender 

































prevent a successful attack.  This paper proposes a four-layer defensive concept 
to protect the resources of an airbase and to preserve the base’s ability to 
generate combat power.   
The four-layered approach (Figure 7) proposes to deal with the threat of 
guided standoff weapons in separate phases.  Those phases are pre-launch, 
post-launch, point defense and attack mitigation.    
 
 







- DISRUPT KILL    
  CHAIN 
- KENETIC SYSTEMS 
- DIRECTED ENERGY 
- NEAR INSTANT 
COUNTER BATTERY 
- TERMINAL INTERCEPT 
  SYSTEMS 
- TARGET OBSCURANTS 
- HARDENING 




The outer layer of an airbase’s defensives against a guided standoff attack 
deals with preventing the launch of guided, standoff weapons.  The base must be 
able to find a way to break the attacker’s kill chain before a launch is made.   
With such a large footprint to control, the need for human intelligence is 
critical.  Gaining the support of the people living in the standoff weapons footprint 
and gathering information from them will provide the defender with critical 
information to disrupt standoff attacks and target the forces that are launching 
them.  Major D. T. Young (2005) provides recommendations for a 
counterinsurgency strategy for airbase defense that may provide some of the 
building blocks for this effort.  By establishing control of the population around the 
base, this strategy severely limits their usefulness to an attacker and turns that 
population into sensors that support the base defense.  It is difficult to conceive 
of a technology that could replace the information gained through interaction with 
the local population while patrolling. 
A complimentary effort to gathering human intelligence is the ability to 
gather information on what is happening in the standoff weapons footprint.  The 
ability to monitor, assess, and target activities in these areas is vital. The 
development of sensor-based systems that can help the base defense force do 
this is critical. 
Once the intelligence information is gathered, the need to project force 
outside the perimeter of the base to stop the attack comes next.  This force can 
be from the base, part of a host-nation security force or from a friendly unit 
operating nearby.   
2. Post-Launch Counter Standoff Systems 
 The defensive measures in the post-launch layer cover the period from the 
launch of a weapon to the coverage by any point defense systems.  The 
development and fielding of counter standoff systems that attempt to destroy the 




direction.  Systems like Skyguard, under development to guard airports against 
man portable surface to air missile threats, (Northrop-Grumman, 2006) might be 
adapted to this purpose.   
A second methodology for a counter standoff system could provide rapid 
counter-battery fire to the standoff weapons launch location or to the location of a 
target designation or control system.  This type of system could interfere with the 
attacker’s ability to terminally guide the weapon or escape by launching rapid 
counter-battery fire on to the attacker’s position.   
A final methodology for counter standoff systems might work on the 
principle of spoofing the guidance system of the standoff round.  The ability to 
send a round to a safe area on the base would negate the effect of an attack.  
The use of chemical obscurants may interfere with laser or visual guidance 
systems, decreasing the accuracy of a guided round.  Any method of reducing 
the accuracy of the round to that of a conventional round might give the passive 
hardening measures a chance to work.  
3. Point Defense Counter Standoff Systems 
A point defense layer of defense could provide a final line of protection for 
critical resources against an incoming guided round.  The U.S. Navy’s Phalanx 
system, designed to protect ships against incoming anti-ship missiles provides an 
example.  The Phalanx, pair a radar-guided fire control system to a 20-millimeter 
Gatling gun to provide point defense.  The U.S. Army, in an attempt to keep the 
weight of armor down, is exploring an active protection system for its new self-
propelled artillery piece and next generation of fighting vehicles 
(GlobalSecurity.org, 2006b).  This system uses sensors to fire a small projectile 
at incoming missiles, mitigating their effectiveness.  However, the use of these or 
any similar systems around an active airfield would have to be carefully studied 
in order to avoid fratricide.        
4. Mitigation 
 The final layer of defense should consist of systems or procedures that 
mitigate the effects of guided standoff weapons.  Any system or effort that can 
improve the hardening of resources against attack or those that immediately  
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respond to the effects of a weapon can improve the survivability of resources.  
The development and deployment of automated fire suppression systems might 
spearhead this effort.   
5. Conclusion 
 The standoff attack has proven itself as an effective method of harassing 
air bases and causing damage for at least 60 years.  Nonetheless, passive and 
active defensive measures have limited the amount of damage that these attacks 
have caused to airbases.  Air base operations were, on occasion, temporarily 
halted by these attacks, but the ability to launch and recover aircraft was quickly 
restored.   
 Advancements in weapons technology and a shift in mission of the USAF 
towards expeditionary operations across the globe have changed the status quo.  
The wide availability of guided anti-tank missiles and guided mortar projectiles 
coupled with a shift away from operations from airfields with hardened, redundant 
systems have created an opportunity for a small number of attackers to cripple 
an airbase and keep it from operating.   
 New tactics techniques and procedures for air base defense must be 
developed.  New systems that can prevent standoff attacks from affecting base 
operations must be studied, resourced, developed, and deployed.  Finally, a new 
level of understanding of the threat posed by ground forces to air bases must be 
reached by our own and allied forces. 
 In the past, the functional nature of the air base defense mission has 
limited the scope of the problem to the areas directly involved.  Support 
personnel, largely working in the Security Forces, Office of Special 
Investigations, and Civil Engineering career fields (to include Fire, Disaster 
Preparedness, and Explosive Ordinance Disposal) have been the advocates for 
base defense issues.  The emergence of the threat of guided, standoff weapons 
attacks has shifted the urgency of this problem.  This is no longer a base defense 
issue; this is an airpower issue.  It will take the dedication and effort of all Airmen 
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APPENDIX 
A. GAME 1 CALCULATIONS 
 
Base Defense Force 
Goal:  Minimize Score 
No Dominant Strategy 
Mixed Strategy 
 
p = percentage of iterations of the game to defend against standoff attacks 
1-p = percentage of iterations of the game to defend against ground attacks 
 
Ev (A) = Ev (B) 
1(1-p) + 80p = 30(1-p) + 15 p 
  p = 29/94 = .309 (Defend against standoff attacks) 
1-p = 65/94 = .691 (Defend against Ground attacks) 
 
In this game, the defense force should defend against a ground attack in 
69.1 percent of the games and defend against standoff attacks 30.9 percent of 
the time.  
1. Value Game 1 for the Defender 
 We can get the expected value of the game by substituting the value of p 
into either expected value formula.  As we can see below, the value of this game 
is 25.372.  The attacker is causing damage to the base and disrupting operations 
but not to the level where he is able to win the game (50 or above).  
 
30(1-p) + 15 p = value of the game 
30(1-(29/94))) + 15 (29/94)) = value of the game 




Level II Force 
Goal:  Maximize Score 
No Dominant Strategy 
Mixed Strategy 
 
q= percentage of iterations of the game to use a standoff attack 
1-q = percentage of iterations of the game to use a ground attack 
 
Ev (C) = Ev (D) 
1(1-q) +30q = 80 (1-q) + 15q 
q = 79/94 = .840 (Use a standoff attack) 
1-q = 15/94 = .160 (Use a ground attack) 
 
 The attacker should use 84 percent standoff attacks and 16 percent 
ground attacks. 
2. Value of Game 1 for the Attacker 
Same as above 
 
B. GAME 2 CALCULATIONS 
 
Base Defense Force 
Goal:  Minimize Score 
No Dominant Strategy 
Mixed Strategy 
 
p = percentage of iterations of the game to defend against standoff attacks 
1-p = percentage of iterations of the game to defend against ground attacks 
 
Ev (A) = Ev (B) 
1(1-p) + 90p = 50(1-p) + 40 p 
  p = 49/99 = .495 (Defend against standoff attacks) 
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1-p = 50/99 = .505 (Defend against Ground attacks) 
 
In this game, the defense force should defend against a ground attack in 
49.5 percent of the games and defend against standoff attacks 50.5 percent of 
the time.  
1. Value of Game 2 for the Defender 
 
50(1-p) + 40 p = value of the game 
50(1-(49/99))) + 40 (49/99)) = value of the game 
Value of Game = 45 5/99 = 45.051 
 
 We can get the expected value of the game by substituting the value of p 
into either expected value formula.  As we can see below, the value of this game 
is 45.051.  The attacker is causing almost twice as much relative damage to the 




Level II Force 
Goal:  Maximize Score 
No Dominant Strategy 
Mixed Strategy 
 
q = percentage of iterations of the game to use a standoff attack 
1-q = percentage of iterations of the game to use a ground attack 
 
Ev (C) = Ev (D) 
1(1-q) + 50q = 90 (1-q) + 40q 
q = 89/99 = .899 (Use a standoff attack) 
1-q = 10/99 = .101 (Use a ground attack) 
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 The attacker should use 89.9 percent standoff attacks and 10.1 percent 
ground attacks. 
2. Value of Game 2 for the Attacker 
Same as above 
C. GAME 3 CALCULATIONS 
Base Defense Force 
Goal:  Minimize Score 
No Dominant Strategy 
Mixed Strategy 
 
p = percentage of iterations of the game to defend against standoff attacks 
1-p = percentage of iterations of the game to defend against ground attacks 
 
Ev (A) = Ev (B) 
1(1-p) + 90p = 10(1-p) + 5 p 
  p = 9/94 = .10 (Defend against standoff attacks) 
1-p = 85/94 = .90 (Defend against Ground attacks) 
 
In this game, the defense force should defend against a ground attack in 
90 percent of the games and defend against standoff attacks 10 percent of the 
time.  
1. Value of Game 3 for the Defender 
 
10(1-p) + 5 p = value of the game 
10(1-(9/94)) + 5 (9/94) = value of the game 
Value of Game = 9 49/94 = 9.52 
 
 We can get the expected value of the game by substituting the value of p 
into either expected value formula.  As we can see below, the value of this game 
is 9.52.  The Level II force is not destroyed but the defender wins the game in 
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this range.  Attacks of the airbase will continue but the damage and disruption to 
operations will be minimal. 
 
Level II Force 
Goal:  Maximize Score 
No Dominant Strategy 
Mixed Strategy 
 
q= percentage of iterations of the game to use a standoff attack 
1-q = percentage of iterations of the game to use a ground attack 
 
Ev(C) = Ev (D) 
1(1-q) +10q = 90 (1-q) + 5q 
q = 89/94 = .947 (Use a standoff attack) 
1-q = 5/94 = .053 (Use a ground attack) 
 The attacker should use 94.7 percent standoff attacks and .053 percent 
ground attacks. 
2. Value of Game 3 for the Attacker 
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